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AUSTRALIA
Foucault and Giddins emphasise the power of the modern "Administra-
tive State", arguing that we now have at our disposal an enormous
bureaucratic machinery for processing and controlling various problem-
atical human behaviours. Australian data on fraud of the social welfare
system are examined to throw light on Foucault's and Giddens' views.
Figures relating to prosecution for fraud of both the Unemployment and
Supporting Parents Benefits system in the last six years throw some
doubt on the concept of a vastly powerful "Administrative State appa-
ratus.'" Certainly a massive state bureaucracy has been established to
apprehend cheats, yet the data show consistently that prosecution for
welfare fraud is running at a low level despite the diligent efforts of a
virtual army of fraud inspectors. If 'pacification' or 'disciplining' of the
underclasses actually is occurring, it probably is not happening-at least,
not at the levels implied by Foucault and Giddens-through the social
welfare arm of the modern Administrative State.
Several influential writers, notably Foucault and Giddens,
have developed an important and interesting 'thesis' about
social problems in the modem Administrative State. They argue
that it is a distinctive characteristic of our time that we have at
our disposal, now more than ever before, the means of control-
ling persons exhibiting various problematical behaviours.
For Foucault, the aim of modern 'disciplinary technologies'
(as he puts it) is to produce a 'docile body that may be subjected,
used, transformed, and improved' (1979, p. 136). The wider
purpose of this growth of disciplinary technologies is said to be
the normalisation of so-called 'anomalies in the social body'.
Foucault's views are echoed and reinforced by Giddens in his
recent examination of the growth of an enormous state adminis-
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trative capacity within the context of what he calls a process of
'internal pacification' (Giddens, 1985, pp. 172-197).
What Foucault and Giddens have to say seems particularly
relevant to the modern social problem of fraud of the social
welfare system. The welfare system is only part of the Adminis-
trative State but it is an important part. Welfare expenditures in
the modern state typically run at around twenty to twenty five
percent of Gross Domestic Product. Although to some extent
popular interest in welfare fraud waxes and wanes, in the long
term outraged public opinion-fuelled by mass media cam-
paigns and pronouncements by politicians-has secured a mas-
sive state administrative response to fraud. The precise targets
vary from place to place. In England it is 'scroungers' and the
'work shy', in America 'welfare chislers', and in Australia 'dole
bludgers' and 'welfare mums' (Feagin, 1975; Murray, 1984;
Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985; Windschuttle, 1980; George and
Wilding, 1984).
The administrative response has been remarkably similar
across such apparently diverse countries as the United States of
America, England, and Australia. Typically it has taken the form
of the establishment of fraud squads-for example, 'Specialist
Claims Control Units' (England) and 'Benefit Control Units' and
'Review Teams' (Australia)-to supplement the large numbers
of full-time investigative staff, whose main duties include the
detection of fraudulent activity and the prosecution of welfare
cheats (Feagin, 1975; Field, 1977; 1979; Deacon, 1978; 1981; Brad-
bury, 1988). A clear sense of the rationale behind this arm of the
'Administrative State' may be gathered from the Australian
Government's own description of its Benefit Control Units. In
language of just the sort referred to by Foucault and Giddens,
these administrative structures are responsible, it is claimed:
for introducing and maintaining preventative and detection
procedures and establishing the incidence of fraud and
incorrect payment in respect of all benefits and pensions...
identifying the causes of incorrect payments, evaluating
existing departmental procedures and systems and develop-
ing systems and policies to ensure that correct payments are
made to those persons entitled to receive them. (Hansard, 6
November, 1979, p. 2569)
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To some extent, then, it appears that an administrative appa-
ratus for surveillance has been established, and in terms familiar
to Foucault and Giddens.
However, even if an administrative apparatus for surveil-
lance and control has been set up, how successful is it? Is welfare
fraud widespread and, if so, just how effective are the Benefit
Control Units and the numerous inspectors in detecting and
prosecuting cheats? In asking those questions there is no claim
to be testing the ideas of Foucault and Giddens in a strict sense.
Neither scholar has written directly about social security or
fraud of the benefit system. Nonetheless, the policing of welfare
fraud occurs within the state apparatus. In that sense the ideas of
Foucault and Giddens provide a valuable theoretical structure to
understand the problem of welfare fraud, a topic usually treated
in an undertheorised, purely statistical way.1
In an earlier study, conviction rates for fraud of the Austral-
ian Unemployment Benefits system were analysed for a four
year period, 1974-75 to 1977-78 (Pemberton, 1980). That study
revealed a low level of abuse, significantly less than one percent
of annual claims for benefits, a figure consistent with the results
of other social science research in England and Australia (Field,
1977; 1979; Deacon, 1978; 1981). The data presented here cover six
years of fraud (1980-81 to 1985-86) of the two benefits about
which there have been the most allegations of abuse, the Unem-
ployment and Supporting Parents Benefits. The information pre-
sented here is derived from an answer in the Australian House
of Representatives by the Minister for Social Security, to a ques-
tion in Parliament (Hansard, No. 20, 1986, pp. 4040-4043). All the
data in the tables are from this source. 2
Estimating the Extent of Abuse
of Unemployment and Supporting
Parents Benefits.
How widespread, then, is fraud of the welfare system? The
figures in Table 1 provide a consistent picture. Considering the
number of convictions and the rate of conviction compared to
the number registered for benefits at the end of each financial
year, it is reasonable to argue that welfare fraud is generally at a
low level in Australia, at least as far as Unemployment and
Supporting Parents Benefits are concerned.3
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Table 1
Welfare Fraud Convictions (as a percentage of beneficiaries registered
at the end of each financial year)
Financial Year
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
Unemployment Benefit
Convictions Beneficiaries Convictions as a
Percentage of
Beneficiaries
63
139
433
600
1222
1140
1007
1240
1514
1494
160748
188423
250309
286091
314500(e)
390664(e)
635002
584506
561400
569761
Supporting Parents Benefits
Financial Year Convictions Beneficiaries Convictions as a
Percentage of
Beneficiaries
1980-81 146 106631 0.13
1981-82 217 123942 0.17
1982-83 227 140228 0.16
1983-84 277 153589 0.18
1984-85 324 168017 0.19
1985-86 325 176730 0.19
Looking first at Unemployment Benefits for the six year
period (1980-81 to 1985-86), convictions for fraud range from a
low of 1,007 (1982-83) to the highest, 1,514 (in 1984-85), an aver-
age of 1,270 per year for the period. In the last year for which
information is available (1985-86), 1,494 persons were suc-
cessfully prosecuted. Furthermore, when expressed as a per-
centage of those on Unemployment Benefits at the end of the
financial year, the rate of conviction for fraud is only .26 of one
percent in 1985-86.
An interesting comparison can be made of these six years
with the period 1974-75 to 1977-78. Even though the actual
numbers convicted are higher now than for any time in the
earlier period, there simply is no sign of an epidemic of "dole
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fraud" in recent years. The latest figure is only marginally
higher than the rate for 1977-78-.26 and .20 respectively of one
percent of all persons registered for "dole" at the end of
the year.
Convictions for fraud of the Supporting Parents Benefit sys-
tem run along similar lines, although the numbers involved are
even smaller. While the actual numbers convicted rose over the
past six years-from 146 (1980-81) to 325 (1985-96)-when these
figures are expressed as a percentage of those on the benefit at
the conclusion of the financial year, there is no significant
increase in abuse. The most recent figure is .19 of one percent of
persons registered for Supporting parents Benefits at the end of
the year (1985-86).
Combining the conviction figures for both types of benefit
simply emphasises the trend. Fraud is low and shows little sign
of a dramatic increase. Less than two thousand are convicted
each year out of more than one and a half million who register
for either Unemployment or Supporting Parents Benefits at
some time during the year (although this figure actually in-
cludes some persons already on the benefit at the start of the
year). Nor is fraud becoming more common: the most recent
figures (for 1984-85 and 1985-86) are very similar to the figures
for the first two years of the six year period.
Calculating the Cost of Welfare Fraud
All discussions about the alleged costs of fraud need to be
balanced by information on the significant savings made by
welfare states due to the failure of many persons to take up the
benefits to which they are entitled. Those who complain about
fraud usually conveniently forget those sums saved by non-
take-up of benefit entitlements (George and Wilding, 1984;
Jones, 1983). Indeed, much of the popular rhetoric about welfare
fraud expresses angry concerns about the real and imagined cost
of such fraud. But for all of the expressed concern, how much
does welfare fraud actually cost the taxpayer? It is vital
to make some estimate of the problem in relation to the enor-
mous administrative machinery set up to police fraud in the
modern state.
The details of estimates of the cost of fraud appear in Table 2.
Turning first to the average amount defrauded per (convicted)
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case in each year, this does not seem particularly high. Nor is
there any sign of a significant increase in the amounts of money
defrauded over the past six years. In 1980-81 the average
amount for each was $1,125 for Unemployment Benefit fraud
and $3,310 for the Supporting Parents Benefit. By 1985-86 the
figures are still only $3,709 and $7,876 respectively. Moreover,
when the necessary adjustment is made for annual inflation the
Table 2
The Cost of Fraud (Australian Dollars)
Unemployment Benefits
Financial Average Adjusted Annual Adjusted Cost of Fraud
Year Amount Average Cost of Annual (est) as a
Per Case Cost Fraud Cost Percentage of
Prosecuted (estimated) Total
Expenditure
on that Benefit
1980-81 1125 1125 1374750 1374750 0.13
1981-82 1483 1336 1690620 1623081 0.13
1982-83 1613 1300 1624291 1309912 0.07
1983-84 1910 1414 2368400 1754370 0.08
1984-85 2541 1752 3847074 2653154 0.12
1985-86 3709 2393 5541246 3574997 0.17
Supporting Parent Benefit
Financial Average Adjusted Annual Adjusted Cost of Fraud
Year Cost Per Average Cost of Annual as a
Case Cost Fraud Cost Percentage
Prosecuted (estimated) Total
Expenditure
on that Benefit
1980-81 3310 3310 483260 483260 0.11
1981-82 4609 4152 1000153 901038 0.16
1982-83 4944 3987 1122288 905070 0.15
1983-84 5778 4280 1600506 1185560 0.18
1984-85 6828 4708 2212272 1525704 0.20
1985-86 7876 5081 2559700 1651419 0.20
figures show that the average amounts per case have not risen
significantly.4 Note that the average amount defrauded is higher
for the Supporting Parents Benefit than for Unemployment Ben-
efits. This may simply reflect the higher cash value of the former
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benefit over the latter, although actual values depend on varia-
tions in the beneficiaries' ages and family size. Although no
official statistics are available for the total cost of fraud annually,
this may be estimated by multiplying the average cost per con-
viction by the number convicted in that year. Thus it can be
calculated that for 1985-86, apprehended Unemployment Bene-
fit fraud cost around $5.5 million and $2.5 million in relation to
Supporting Parents Benefit. There is no indication of startling
increases in the cost of fraud in the last six years: in 1980-81 the
(estimated) total was about $1.8 million rising to $8 million in the
final year for which information is available. Again, when these
figures are converted to constant prices to account for inflation,
the general trend remains.
A comparison of the (estimated) total amount defrauded per
year with the total annual expenditure on each benefit tells a
similar story. For 1985-86 the estimated cost is .17 of one percent
of total expenditure on Unemployment Benefits (.13 in 1980-81)
and .2 of one per cent for Supporting Parents Benefit (.11 in 1980-
81). Combining the value of fraud of both kinds of benefit, the
figures are .13 of one percent in 1980-87) and .18 in 1985-86.
Clearly there has been little growth in the cost of fraud related to
the total expenditure on those benefits; the overall cost of fraud
remains relatively constant.
Some further appreciation of the cost of fraud may be gained
from Table 3, where the estimated annual cost is considered in
relation to the numbers on each benefit. The estimated real value
of fraud of Supporting Parents Benefits per recipient has dou-
bled from $4.00 to $9.00 over the six years, while for Unemploy-
ment Benefits the increase has been slower, to $6.00 defrauded
per year for every beneficiary from the same base figure.
An interesting implication follows from the data on the
average cost of fraud per convicted case. Because the sums
involved are so low-particularly in the case of Unemployment
Benefits, averaging less than $2,000 per conviction until 1983-
84-doubts naturally arise about the existence, or at least about
the regular application of, an administrative threshold below
which it is said to be not worth the time and effort to prosecute.
And our confidence increases that the conviction figures may
account for substantially all of the welfare fraud that occurs.
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Rather than being merely the tip of an iceberg-where what
remains undetected is a large number of mostly petty amounts
each barely worth prosecuting, but adding up to a sizeable
Table 3
The Cost of Fraud in Relation to Numbers on Benefits (Australian Dollars)
Unemployment Benefits Supporting Parents Benefit
Financial Total Adjusted Average Total Adjusted Average
Year Beneficiaries Annual Cost Beneficiaries Annual Cost
at End of Cost at End of Cost
Year Year
1980-81 314500 1374750 4.37 106631 483260 4.53
1981-82 390664 1523081 389 123942 901038 7.26
1982-83 635002 1309912 2.06 140228 905070 6.45
1983-84 584506 1754370 3.00 153589 1185560 7.71
1984-85 561400 2653154 4.72 168017 1525704 9.08
1985-86 569761 3574997 6.27 176730 1651419 9.34
sum-the fraud conviction data should accurately represent the
extent of welfare abuse caught in an efficient Administrative
State net. Certainly the low average cost per convicted case over
the last six years offers little support for the proposition that
only big fish get caught while the more numerous small fry
escape through a gap in the net caused by an administrative
threshold (below which it is just not worth taking the formal
steps of prosecution).
However, the value of overpayments must now be brought
into the calculation of costs. Indeed the overpayment figures do
give more cause for concern than the amounts involved directly
in conviction for fraud. Overpayment is, of course, a blanket
term. It covers both clerical oversight and the improper receipt
of money to which the beneficiary is not entitled. Typically the
former includes inevitable administrative errors, while the latter
includes both genuine and deliberate failure to declare changed
benefit status, as well as deliberate fiddling such as not declaring
income earned while receiving a benefit. By contrast, the use of
multiple, false identities and addresses to claim several bene-
fits-perhaps the public stereotype of abuse-is more likely to
attract fraud charges than to be dealt with as overpayment,
particularly if it is protracted or involves large sums of money.
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But it is important not to equate the overpayment figures
directly with small time fraud-although some, perhaps even
much of it, may be. Nonetheless, the amounts involved per year
in overpayments, even after substantial sums are recovered by
the government, give rise to some disquiet (Table 4).
Table 4
Overpayment: Unemployment and Supporting Parents Benefits (Australian
dollars)
Unemployment Benefits* Supporting Parents Benefit*
Financial Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount
Year Debited Credited Debited as a Debited Credited Debited as a
as a % % of Total % of Total
Expenditure Expenditure
on that on that
Benefit Benefit
1980-81 8.22 6.53 0.82 3.59 1.32 0.87
1981-82 9.60 6.82 0.77 4.96 1.84 0.81
1982-83 17.09 9.83 0.76 8.52 2.80 1.17
1983-84 27.02 16.18 0.92 11.51 4.02 1.29
1984-85 26.60 18.58 0.89 10.78 5.28 1.01
1985-86 32.45 25.78 1.03 15.62 7.73 1.26
*millions of dollars
As a percentage of total annual expenditure on Unemploy-
ment and Supporting Parents Benefits in 1985-86, overpayment
(amount debited) amounted to around 1.10%, to which both
kinds of benefit contributed in about equal proportions (1.03 and
1.26% respectively). This represents an increase, albeit a modest
one, on the 1980-81 figures of .82% in relation to Unemployment
Benefits and .87% for Supporting Parents Benefits.
The actual sums involved are quite considerable. In 1985-86,
$32.45 million was debited as overpayment in relation to Unem-
ployment Benefits, while the figure was nearly $16 million for
Supporting Parents Benefits-a total of around $48 million. Yet
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it is also the case that substantial amounts were actually recov-
ered; nearly $26 million of the Unemployment Benefit overpay-
ment ($32 million) and nearly $8 million of the Supporting
Parents Benefit overpayment ($16 million) was actually paid
back to the government. So some $34 million was recovered of
the $48 million total overpaid in the first place. Nevertheless,
these are significant sums of money when it is realised that an
enormous administrative effort is required to locate missing
money and to recover it. This administrative burden must, in an
important sense, be added to the actual identified costs of over-
payment and fraud.
The 'Administrative State' Apparatus for
the Apprehension of Welfare Fraud
We can now look more closely at the claims of Foucault and
Giddens about the growth of administrative power and an
apparently increased capacity for surveillance of the population.
There is no doubt that concern about welfare fraud has given
rise to an administrative response characterised by increased
surveillance and higher penalties. Like their counterparts in
other Welfare States, successive Australian governments have
declared their commitment to eradicating inefficiency and fraud
in welfare services. In an important sense, however, the suc-
cessful pursuit of abuse is dependent upon the number and
disposition of staff engaged in investigative work. Table 5 gives
the details of staff numbers in relation to their salary costs
and conviction rates. A useful distinction is drawn between
two different kinds of personnel working on the apprehension
of fraud.
On the one hand there are the Field Officers, normally
engaged in a variety of welfare tasks, but also for whom a
significant part of their work 'is concerned with cases of incor-
rect payment and a proportion of this relates to fraud' (Hansard,
No. 20 1986, pp. 4040-4043). Their numbers have risen over the
past six years, from 375 (1980-81) to 559 (1985-86). On the other
hand, there are some specialist staff positions, located in the
Benefit Control Units, established to deal primarily with over-
payment and fraud (Hansard, 6 November, 1979). The Benefit
Control Units show similar signs of steady development with
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staff numbers more than doubling from 114, in 1980-81, to 237 in
1985-86.
Table 5
Field Staff: Salary Costs (Australian Dollars), Conviction Rates and Benefici-
aries
Field Staff Benefit Control Unit Total (Field plus Average Total
Staff Benefit Control Staff) Prosecu- Field Staff
tions per as a per-
Year centage of
Total
Beneoici-
aries
Financial Numbers Salary Numbers Salary Numbers Salary
Year Costs Costs Costs
(millions) (millions)
1980-81 375 4.85 114 1.84 489 6.69 2.79 0.16
1981-82 386 5.94 130 2.50 516 8.44 2.63 0.10
1982-83 424 7.07 213 4.44 637 11.51 1.93 1.93
1983-84 513 9.20 219 4.91 732 14.11 2.07 0.90
1984-85 574 11.28 228 5.60 802 16.88 2.29 0.10
1985-86 559 11.56 237 6.13 796 17.69 2.28 0.10
For both types of staff, then, the numbers have grown con-
sistently, indicating a clear, unswerving government commit-
ment to the elimination of waste and fraud. These staff numbers
amount to a formidable administrative machinery, backed up by
the kind of modem electronic data processing facilities that
Giddens referred to in his account of developments in the
Administrative State. Clearly then, the facilities for surveillance
and control have been established and, what is striking, in terms
similar to Foucault's and Giddens' analyses of Administrative
State power.
It is worth looking briefly at some of the costs involved in
setting up such 'disciplinary technologies'. Where staff numbers
have increased, so too has their salary bill. For Field Officers the
salary costs have risen from $4.85 million in 1980-81 (375 offi-
cers) to $11.56 million in 1985-86 (559). Salary costs for the
Benefit Control Units also rose, from $1.84 million in 1980-81
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(114 staff) to $6.3 million by 1985-86 (237). This salary bill for
investigative work, along with other, unspecified legal and
administrative costs (Hansard No. 20, 1986 pp. 4040-4043), may
quite properly be added to the total costs of overpayment and
fraud each year.
So the administrative machinery is there. But how effective
are the inspectors? It is one thing to set up structures of surveil-
lance, but we should not automatically assume they fulfill their
purpose. It is interesting to look at the annual conviction rate for
each of the six years (1980-81 to 1985-86) produced by the
administrative apparatus (Table 5). Although it is to some extent
arbitrary to divide total annual convictions by the number of
investigative staff (both Field Officers and Benefit Control Unit
personnel), such a calculation provides two valuable insights.5
First, the average annual rate of conviction is quite low, 2.33 per
officer for the past six years and second, these figures are
remarkably consistent over the whole period, 1980-81 to 1985-86.
The average for 1985-86 (2.28) is close to the figure for 1980-81
(2.79). Indeed at no time over the past six years is the annual
conviction rate more than 3 per officer. This provides some
further evidence-along with the consistently low annual levels
of conviction and the low rate of conviction compared to the
number of beneficiaries-that fraud is not particularly common.
The clear and reasonable inference is that the average convic-
tion rate per investigator is consistently low because fraud itself
is low.
However, despite such evidence, many observers remain
convinced that welfare fraud occurs on a massive scale. Some try
to negate these figures by invoking stereotypes of lazy civil
servants. In their opinion the field staff do not try hard enough.
On this view welfare fraud is in epidemic proportions, but the
conviction rate is low because investigation is not pursued dili-
gently.
In fact, quite the opposite is probably true. There are some
grounds for believing that field staff are kept extremely busy,
working constantly under severe pressure. In this regard it is
interesting to compare the ratio of field staff to total benefici-
aries, as an indicator of their potential work loads (Table 5). As
can be seen, field staff are spread pretty thinly. The ratio is
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consistently unfavourable, approximately one field officer for
every one thousand Unemployment and Supporting Parents
beneficiaries. It must also be remembered that inspectoral duties
involve policing the recipients of other benefits and pensions
(e.g., Old Age Pensions). But not only are potential case loads
high. The reality of this aspect of the 'Administrative State'
apparatus is that the full range of inspectoral work in relation
to overpayment of all kinds is onerous and time consuming-
as field officers confirm in informal interviews. For example,
each case of overpayment generates a lot of paperwork; this is
particularly so in relation to investigations leading to prosecu-
tion for fraud.
It can probably safely be assumed, then, that the work load
of field staff is heavy. So, it is quite likely that even though they
are kept busy investigating overpayment, they nevertheless only
rarely encounter serious cases of fraud-defined in terms of the
wilful intent to defraud and by the large amount of money
involved. On this view the actual instances of blatant, serious
abuse are rare, and thus the low conviction rates mirror that fact
faithfully. However, it surely must be conceded that if field staff
are busy with overpayment investigations and other welfare
duties, it could easily happen that a great deal of serious fraud is
missed simply because they are so preoccupied. That is, fraud
may be common but the field staff are too absorbed in other
matters to be able to complete any more than about two pros-
ecutions each year. Or, it may be that minor swindling is quite
common, but that under such heavy work pressures the rational
field investigator, to avoid being overwhelmed, adopts a deci-
sion rule to prosecute only the most blatant cases or those where
large sums of money are involved.
So we have two quite different possibilities about the appa-
ratus of surveillance in the welfare system, both consistent with
the facts of overworked field staff and low rates of prosecution.
On the one hand, there is the possibility that while the staff are
busy with all kinds of overpayment, and petty fiddling is com-
mon, the actual cases of genuine, serious fraud are few and far
between. On the other hand, it could be that the field staff are so
busy with all of their duties, including and especially with
relatively minor overpayment, they only have time to identify
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and apprehend a few of the many serious abuses of the system.
At present the available data do not permit us to settle the issue
one way or another. However, it should be remembered that the
average amount involved in prosecutions is consistently low,
which suggests that inspectors are probably not just focussing
on 'big game'. It is now clear that research based on official
statistics will need to be supplemented by participant observa-
tion studies to look more closely at the 'practical reasoning' and
work practices of field staff in situ (Anderson, 1977; Beck, 1967).
The overall trends are important, but we also need to see how
field decisions actually are made to prosecute or to deal with a
problem in some other way, such as offering conditions for the
return of money overpaid in return for not prosecuting. First
hand observational data will be necessary to supplement the
official statistics, if we are to tackle these crucial questions about
administrative surveillance of welfare recipients. One must con-
cede, however, that as field officers personally report being
swamped by the sheer volume of work-and this is entirely
consistent with the low ratio of inspectors to beneficiaries-then
it is highly likely that some fraud, though precisely just how
much it is hard to say, will slip through any investigative net set
up by the 'Administrative State'.
Welfare Fraud in
the 'Administrative State'
From the official statistics examined here on fraud of the
Australian welfare system, the followers of the ideas of Foucault
and Giddens may need to modify their views about 'disciplinary
technologies' in the modem 'Administrative State'. Certainly
there are good grounds for claiming that there has been the
establishment of an apparatus for surveillance and control of a
'problem population', what might be called an 'underclass' on
welfare. That much is clear from the data examined here on
investigative staff and Benefit Control Units. But while much
surveillance apparently does take place, it is less clear-from the
data on overpayment and the low rates of conviction for welfare
fraud-whether much actual 'disciplining' or 'pacification' is
involved there. The setting up of an extensive administrative
apparatus is no guarantee of its effectiveness. Indeed, in Austra-
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ha the actual numbers 'caught' in the system are quite low
compared to the cost and amount of effort expended to appre-
hend cheats. This point has not gone unnoticed by other writers
on the role of the state, some of whom argue that we tend to
overemphasise the activities of bureaucrats and their alleged
impact on our attitudes and behaviour. Raeff, writing about the
so-called 'well ordered police state', argues that:
While it may be true that many ordinances were not actually
implemented and many regulations more often breached
than obeyed, they do, nevertheless, provide evidence of the
efforts made by rulers and administrators to move their
societies in specific ways and directions, to shape their popu-
lation, economics, and cultural life according to set stan-
dards and norms. In the long run, in spite of resistance and
failures there did emerge an active, productive, efficient, and
rationalistic style of economic and cultural behaviour, and in
this development the constant prodding and structuring by
administrative action played a significant, or rather an essen-
tial and seminal role (1984, p. 44).
Raeff's focus is on the effect of state policing to 'civilise the lower
orders', from the sixteenth century onwards. Yet the terms are
strikingly similar to the debate about administrative action to
reinforce proper attitudes towards work among the working
class today (Windschuttle, 1980). However, as several scholars
have reminded us, it is easy to make too much of these argu-
ments (Scribner, 1987; van Krieken, 1989). So 'what might appear
to be a "well-ordered police state" seen from above and from
the outside often turns out to be much less ordered and rational
once one examines its day-to-day operation and observes its
reliance on consent often withheld as well as the sheer ineffec-
tiveness of much of the absolutist state's interventions' (Van
Krieken, 1989, pp. 13-14). The data presented here, on fraud in
the Australian welfare system, provide interesting insights into
the working of the modem Administrative State. It seems that at
least as far as the study of welfare fraud is concerned, the onus is
on those who insist that large scale 'discipline' and 'pacification'
has taken place, to look again.6
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Notes
1 The data examined in this paper are confined to only two of the many
cash benefits available in the Australian system, but the two about which there
has been most adverse publicity about fraud. There is no attempt to deal in a
precise way with the thorny conceptual and methodological difficulties
Pacification
involved in defining and measuring 'fraud'. Commenting on the complexity of
the issues, Bradbury notes that: 'At one extreme there are those who use false
identities to receive multiple benefits, or receive benefits while employed in
full-time jobs. At the other are those long-term unemployed who may have
stopped looking for work in frustration. In between there are 'over-payment
cases', where people are not prompt in notifying the Department of Social
Security when they find work, and cases of people not declaring income
received from part-time work or other sources while on benefit' (Bradbury,
1988, p. 2).
2 The difficulties of obtaining adequate data on welfare fraud are well
known and have been discussed elsewhere (Windschuttle, 1980; Field, 1977,
1979 Pemberton, 1980). One particular problem needs to be mentioned briefly
in passing, the question of an administrative threshold or 'cut-off' point in
relation to decisions about whether or not to prosecute. Although governments
are loath to admit it, a welfare bureaucracy may need to operate with a lower
limit or 'cut-off' point (e.g., Aust. $2000), below which it simply is not worth
undertaking the costly formalities of prosecution. If such a cut-off point exists,
in spite of government denial, then of course the official conviction figures may
underestimate the actual incidence of fraud, especially the incidence of petty
fiddling. Nonetheless, as several researchers have pointed out, conviction rates
are probably still the best indicator of fraud available (Field, 1977, 1979; Wind-
schuttle, 1980). However, fraud is not the only way that welfare payments go
astray. Data on prosecutions are always usefully supplemented by information
on 'overpayment'-a government statistic that includes money lost through
both small-time fiddling by beneficiaries and clerical errors and oversights by
officers of the Department of Social Security.
3 Two qualifications should be noted in passing. Firstly, that the convic-
tion data do not allow us to distinguish precisely between 'convictions' and
'persons convicted'. Secondly, in Table 1 successful convictions are expressed
as a proportion of beneficiaries registered at the end of each year. Depending
on the time taken to secure a successful conviction, fraud may actually relate
sometimes to the number of beneficiaries in previous years, rather than to the
numbers in which the conviction is obtained. For instance, Unemployment
Benefit convictions fell between 1981-82 and 1982-83, despite a substantial
increase in the number of beneficiaries. Convictions rise markedly in the
following year, indicating the possibility, at times, of a one year delay before
convictions are obtained.
4 To account for the effects of inflation it is necessary to recalculate the
figures using an (official) Implicit Price Deflator (Australian National
Accounts: National Income and Expenditure, 1984-85); that is, to divide the
current price value by its corresponding constant price value.
5 Although both kinds of staff are involved in the apprehension of abuse,
those in the Benefit Control Units are primarily, even solely, working in that
role, whereas the Field Officers generally are involved in a variety of welfare
tasks. Furthermore, details of staff numbers in the Benefit Control Units do not
permit us to ascertain whether different grades of staff are included and, if so,
whether all the persons included in the total carry out investigative work only
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or whether some are there in a purely clerical capacity. Nonetheless, the
computation of an average conviction rate based on a combined conviction rate
from both kinds of staff does enable us to make useful comparisons over the six
years.
6 1 would like to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Robert Tickner (MHR
Sutherland in the Australian Parliament); Robert van Krieken and Stuart Rees
(Department of Social Work and Social Policy, The University of Sydney); and
several staff members of the Commonwealth Department of Social Security, in
particular "Waterspout" and "Confidentially Connie".
